Dead Ends

Another writing sample for a newspaper:

The departure of Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas appears to have been the final blow to President Bush’s “Roadmap to Peace”. Despite his best wishes and intentions to the contrary, a lack of decisive action and unrealistic expectations on his part made failure inevitable. Though the situation is not hopeless, a great deal of momentum has been lost and tremendous energy is needed to rescue this noble mission.
T
hough it is neither fair nor accurate to pin the source of violence on America or anyone other than the parties involved, it is easy to underestimate how many cards the United States is holding. Since the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel, Israel has received enormous amounts of US military aid. This year we spent $2.79 billion. Next year we plan to spend $2.9 billion. The President has watched the situation fall back into chaos, issuing vague statements calling for proportionality in retaliation and calling overkill “not helpful.” Bush has also condemned a wall that the Ariel Sharon has ordered built that has thus far followed roughly the pre-1967 Yom Kippur War boundaries, but many fear it will eventually veer deep into the West Bank. Recognizing that it might only strengthen the Jihadist militants like Hamas, Bush has also condemned the recent decision to expel the secularist Yassir Arafat from the occupied territories. Despite all his requests, Sharon feels secure that the paycheck will come in no matter which course his government takes.

Secondly, unrealistic and dangerous expectations were embedded into the roadmap. First among them was the expectation that the Palestinian Authority could completely scourge terrorism. It was hardly realistic to expect the weakened Palestinian Authority to control the more powerful religious militants. Even had Arafat or Abbas tried, it would more than likely spark a civil war where the Jihadi’s had the upper hand in popularity and funds. By allowing outside groups beyond the control of the negotiating parties involved the ability to derail the entire process through what they do best – create mayhem – Bush handed the power of success or failure over to Hamas and Palestinian Jihad. The only way Bush could have avoided this outcome would have been to directly bring said groups to the negotiating table as well. Politically and strategically, negotiating with some of the most brutal terrorist the planet has ever seen was out of the question.

Ultimately, the option of peace belongs with the Israeli government. Israel can continue on the path of total war against militants in its occupied territories, it can choose to negotiate with the militants, or it can abandon the territories once the wall is completed. There are no easy, painless options in the Middle East peace process.