Paper Promises
A letter written to Stratfor:
"But as with North Korea, Iranian leaders know that nuclear weapons are more valuable as a bargaining chip than as a reality. Asymmetry leads to eradication of nuclear threats. Put less pretentiously, Tehran must assume that the United States -- or Israel -- will destroy any nuclear capability before it becomes a threat. Moreover, if it has nuclear capability, what would it do with it? Even as a deterrent, retaliation would lead to national annihilation. The value of nuclear weapons in this context is less real than apparent -- and therefore more valuable in negotiations than deployment."
- An Unlikely Alliance
Fundamentally, I must disagree with your assessment. Though the assessment that the US and Israel would do everything they could to stop a fully developed program, like that of Osirak in 1981, it becomes much less possible to launch such a strike once nuclear capability is reached. This is where the disagreement comes into play. The nuclear threat of even a handful of low-yield bombs provides deterrent enough to insure against “regime change” better than any conventional military force could.
No doubt, we’re looking at super-asymmetry. The loss of Tokyo, Seoul, Tel Aviv, an aircraft carrier battle group, or a Marine Expeditionary Unit is enough to deter all but the must warranted aggression. Though Pyongyang or Tehran would be flattened during such an exchange, it is a threat that must be made real. There is as much reality behind these threats and assurances of mass destruction as there was during the MAD years of the Cold War. However ridiculous the logic may seem, it is the working logic nonetheless. As such, there is little reason to believe that Tehran or Pyongyang would really bargain away their best and only means of survival for paper promises.
Tags: Treyopia Spinnaker Current Events Iraq North Korea North Korea nuclear WMD negotiations Stratfor
